Given the sporadic release of pre-election data, the lack of standardization across opinion polls, the formation of new political alliances between polls, the long and ever-changing list of smaller and fairly insignificant parties, and the very low proficiency all journalists tend to possess as a whole in understanding and reporting data, it’s very hard to get a clear understanding of where things exactly stand less than thirty days before elections. Therefore, just for my own understanding, I found it necessary to try to work through all of the polling in order to come up up with a reasonably clear picture of the current situation and the general trends. Once I had done that, I thought the results were worth putting into article form and sharing.

I used the four Gallup International/MPG polls released over the last four months. I tried to create consistency in the data by combining the parties in the older polls which have since formed alliances. I also disregarded parties and alliances receiving less than 2 percent of the vote. The following is the data for all eligible voters over the past four months.

For the sake of consistency of data, I combined the individual totals of Robert Kocharyan and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ՀՅԴ) as well as those of the Republican Party of Armenia and the Fatherland Party for the three older polls, before each formed their respective alliances. It should also be noted that in the first three polls, there was no questionnaire option for Armenian Renaissance (ՎՀԿ), which held its public launch on May 5th and is the third political entity that forms the Հայաստան alliance. Also, it should further be noted that in the April poll questionnaire, the Պատիվ Ունեմ alliance between HHK and the Fatherland party was simply listed as the HHK-led bloc, with no mention of the Fatherland Party. This should therefore lead one to assign less significance to the 1.1 percent figure from April.

Finally, to avoid confusion, please distinguish between the pro-government Republic Party (ՀԿ) of Aram Sargsyan and the former ruling party of Serzh Sargsyan, the Republican Party of Armenia (ՀՀԿ). On a similar note, distinguish between the aforementioned Republic Party (ՀԿ), and the Fatherland Party of Artur Vanetsyan (which has the same Armenian initials as ՀԿ) which is in an alliance with ՀՀԿ in the Պատիվ Ունեմ alliance. To avoid confusion, In this article I refer to Artur Vanetsyan’s party only in its full name and only in English, while I refer to Aram Sargsyan’s party as ՀԿ.

Next, I took a look at the alternative answers provided in the four polls, to try to create a reasonable picture of likely voters. This meant looking at and accounting for the percentage of voters that gave answers such as “will not be voting”, “undecided”. and “refuse to answer”. The following is what I found across the four polls:

Finally, using the data above, I was able to form a reasonable picture of the polling for likely voters.

If you are not familiar with the Armenian political landscape, please note that the ruling party and ՀԿ can be considered firmly in the socially liberal/pro-western/anti-nationalist government camp, while the equally liberal Bright Armenia Party (ԼՀԿ) can be considered somewhat in the government camp. On the opposition side, the Հայաստան and Պատիվ Ունեմ alliances can be considered firmly in the socially conservative/pro-Russia/nationalist opposition camp, with the equally socially conservative Prosperous Party of Armenia (ԲՀԿ) somewhat in the opposition camp, but largely limited to whatever best serves the personal interests of Gagik Tsarukyan. Both ԼՀԿ and ԲՀԿ can be expected to be willing to cross lines if it serves their interests.

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Understanding This Data

If all you were looking for was a general understanding of where the numbers stand as of now and mathematics and statistics are not your favorite topic, nor do you have a great understanding of the Armenian political landscape, I would recommend stopping right there, as the next part is going to get quite complex with many moving parts. However, if you already have some familiarity with both the political landscape as well as the necessary moderate proficiency in statistics, keep reading to get a full understanding of the current situation.

Understanding the Electoral Code

Before providing my analysis of where things stand, the following are critical parts of the Armenian electoral code that must be understood. I only included the parts that are pertinent to the results of the current polling data:

• All political parties must receive a minimum of five percent of the vote to enter parliament. All political alliances must receive a minimum of seven percent. This means as things stand ԼՀԿ and ՀԿ being under five percent, and Պատիվ Ունեմ being under seven percent, would not enter parliament.
• Parliamentary seats will be divided among parties and alliances that have cleared the necessary thresholds, based on the percentages of votes receives. Meaning as it stands (Scenario I), with Պատիվ Ունեմ and ԼՀԿ and ՀԿ not clearing the necessary thresholds, the ruling party would receive 57.3 percent of parliamentary seats, keeping control of the government (first graphic below). Moreover, even if only Պատիվ Ունեմ cleared the necessary threshold (Scenario II), the ruling party would likely still receive a majority of the vote needed to retain power. Finally, if all three of Պատիվ Ունեմ, ԼՀԿ, and ՀԿ get in (Scenario III), the ruling party will likely be able to form a coalition with Aram Sargsyan’s ՀԿ, and retain power).

• If a party or coalition gets less than fifty-four percent, but more than fifty percent, they will be granted the additional seats needed to reach a fifty-four percent majority. (Please note the difference between a coalition and an alliance. A coalition is formed post-election between parties and alliances in order to form a ruling government. An example would be a coalition between the Հայաստան alliance, ԲՀԿ, and Պատիվ Ունեմ alliance. An alliance is formed pre-election, such as the Հայաստան alliance between ՀՅԴ, Robert Kocharyan, and ՎՀԿ or that of Պատիվ Ունեմ between ՀՀԿ and the Fatherland Party.) This rule would be important in Scenario II, where all the ruling party would need would be a majority.
• If a ruling government is not formed within six days of the election, a runoff will be held between the top two parties, where the winner will receive the additional seats needed to reach fifty-four percent.
• A ruling coalition can be formed by up to three parties or coalitions. Meaning in the scenario that both Պանիվ Ունեմ and ԼՀԿ clear the necessary thresholds, but ՀԿ doesn’t, even if ԼՀԿ genuinely wanted to end the current government by forming a coalition with the Հայաստան alliance, ԲՀԿ, and the Պատիվ Ունեմ alliance, it would not be possible. In such a scenario, if the ruling party has not received a majority, there will be a run-off election between the ruling party and the Հայաստան alliance.

Analysis of Data

Let me first of all be very clear and open as always that I consider the ruling government and its allies and loyalists as nothing but a foreign occupation and an extension of the governments of Turkey and Azerbaijan, responsible for perhaps the most heinous act of treason any government has ever committed against its own nation in the history of mankind, and that absolutely nothing short of the reinstatement and widespread implementation of the death penalty should be demanded of a future government for a long list of people that form the current government in both official and unofficial capacities. With that said, the following is my best effort at providing a fact-based analysis of the available data, with some commentary added on. Because only with an honest understanding of facts can one hope to work effectively towards victory.

First and foremost, it is undeniable that based on the data below, every single day the ruling party is losing support, and that the Հայաստան alliance is gaining ground- far beyond what I personally as a cautious supporter thought was possible. Only the most recent poll was taken after the formation of the Հայաստան coalition. Moreover, all of the important players that support this alliance- as well as the Պատիվ Ունեմ alliance- the Armenian church, the Armed Forces, the major Russian-Armenian business leaders, major cultural figures in Armenia as well as the Diaspora, the Russian government, and the many affiliates, wings, and allies of ՀՅԴ, have yet to make significant public statements or take significant public steps in their favor. Something that is certain to happen. Finally, it should be understood that ՎՀԿ is not the typical nascent party. It’s composed of virtually every last significant political and business leader in the Syunik region. Not only are they guaranteed to sweep virtually every last district of Syunik, but they should also be expected to be able to exert influence across the entire country.

If current trends continue for the next month at a similar pace, with the ruling party losing support and the Հայաստան alliance gaining, only the fairly unlikely scenario (Scenario IV) of Պատիվ Ունեմ being left out, and ԼՀԿ and ՀԿ getting in may be enough to secure a coalition majority for the current government and its allies.

The second important point that needs to be stated is that the fate of the Պատիվ Ունեմ alliance in passing the seven percent threshold will likely decide this election. I cannot understand why the five parties involved in the two coalitions were unable to form a single political entity, and the events of the past three years have left me incapable of believing there’s some greater plan or motivation beyond egos and personal interests.

I also find it difficult to believe that the Պատիվ Ունեմ alliance has access to some private data that contradicts public data and gives them full confidence in that they will definitely pass the threshold. And I do not have any hopes that the Պատիվ Ունեմ alliance will drop out and endorse the Հայաստան alliance, or that the Հայաստան alliance will do what it needs to ensure its ally crosses the threshold. And so what we have left is those who I consider responsible for the welfare of the country once again seemingly prioritizing their personal interests and personal differences and in the process enabling the foreign occupation of Yerevan, just as they did three years ago.

The third factor to consider is monitoring the performance of ԼՀԿ and ՀԿ and whether they cross the necessary threshold. Because every vote they receive without crossing the threshold can be considered a wasted vote that would have otherwise gone to the ruling party. On the other hand, them entering parliament can only have negative consequences for the fortunes of the opposition.

Finally, in no way should the election be considered inevitable nor its legitimacy even remotely guaranteed. The ruling government has proven that at best it has zero interest in the welfare of the country, and at worst, directly serves the interests of Armenia’s enemies. Therefore, it should be expected for the government to take drastic and destructive steps such as launching war or promoting civil strife in order to justify canceling the election if it believes it is set to lose them. On a similar note, it should be expected for Azerbaijan to do whatever it can to assist the ruling government in retaining power. Unfortunately, were it to decide to cancel elections, the ruling party can expect the legitimacy provided by the support of ԼՀԿ and ԲՀԿ, the only other forces in parliament. This is because as it stands new elections would mean ԲՀԿ’s representation in parliament dropping from 25 seats to roughly 8, and ԼՀԿ’s from 17 to 0.

Conclusion and Prediction

At this point, even his biggest adversaries and detractors must admit there seems to be an aura of invincibility and sense of inevitability about Robert Kocharyan and the Հայաստան alliance. He seems incredibly determined to achieve the improbable goal that he has set for himself. I personally try to stay away from such sentiments and limit myself to data. And based on all available data at the time, I found the idea of participating in elections and the hopeful predictions by the Kocharyan camp as fairly irresponsible and improbable.

However, seeing him so quickly surpass all previously predicted limits and in such dramatic fashion, recognizing the high degree of sophistication that his campaign seems to possess- far beyond the capabilities of local Armenian companies, and understanding the considerable funds that his campaign seems to have at its disposal- far beyond the personal financial wealth of either himself (despite what you may have heard) or those of the two parties in his coalition, it seems clear that this is a campaign that is both highly competent and effective, and that it has managed to secure the support of major backers.

Therefore I foresee the end of the treasonous government as inevitable. How it occurs is the question. It will be preferable for it to end via elections with no more additional suffering and chaos for a country that can’t possibly afford any more of either. The alternative is that we may witness the ruling party attempt to cancel the elections, or blatantly falsify its results in order to achieve victory, resulting in civil strife and further damage to Armenia, before the regime is finally toppled in the aftermath. Unfortunately, knowing the ruling party and all that has taken place over the past three years, I’m inclined to believe it will be the latter.